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THE 1969 TAX REFORM ACT AND CHARITIES: 
FIFTY YEARS LATER 
Philip Hackney* 
Fifty years ago, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to 
regulate charitable activity of the rich.1 Congress constricted the influence of 
the wealthy on private foundations and hindered the abuse of dollars put into 
charitable solution through income tax rules. Concerned that the likes of the 
Mellons, the Rockefellers, and the Fords were putting substantial wealth into 
foundations for huge tax breaks while continuing to control those funds for 
their own private ends, Congress revamped the tax rules to force charitable 
foundations created and controlled by the wealthy to pay out charitable 
dollars annually and avoid self-dealing. Today, with concerns of similar 
misuse of philanthropic institutions to further wealthy interests,2 it is 
worthwhile to reconsider this significant legislation fifty years later. 
Natural questions arise. What was the goal of Congress with respect to 
charity and with respect to tax? Did it accomplish these goals? Are those 
goals still relevant? What goals might suggest themselves today? Do we have 
the ability to modify the law to support those new goals? On November 1, 
2019, the Pittsburgh Tax Review hosted a symposium to examine the 1969 
Tax Act. 
Pittsburgh was a fit and proper place to ask these questions. Andrew 
Carnegie founded Carnegie Steel along the three rivers of Pittsburgh and 
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1 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). 
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penned what Benjamin Soskis refers to as the urtext of modern philanthropy,3 
The Gospel of Wealth, in 1889.4 There Carnegie said the “gospel of wealth” 
called “upon the millionaire to sell all that he hath and give it in the highest 
and best form to the poor, by administering his estate himself for the good of 
his fellows, before he is called upon to lie down and rest upon the bosom of 
Mother Earth.”5 The 1969 Tax Act did not deny the “millionaire” their right 
to do as Carnegie directs and gain tax benefits. But Congress structured the 
Act with distrust that the millionaire would take such actions out of the 
goodness of their heart. This distrust was aimed to stop the millionaire from 
taking advantage of the tax benefits derived from charitable organizations. It 
had the practical effect though of regulating the millionaire engaging in 
charity in this private foundation form. 
Pittsburgh is also the city of Frick, Mellon, Heinz, and Westinghouse. 
This city once of steel, coal, banking, ketchup, and electrical generation is 
now a city of higher education, high tech, and cutting-edge health care all 
backed in part by the philanthropy generated from these past acts. It thus 
presents an ideal environment to explore the issue of philanthropy carried out 
by the wealthy in the past and continuing today. Its five biggest private 
foundations by assets in 2017 include the Richard King Mellon Foundation 
at $2.5 billion, Heinz Endowments at $1.6 billion, Sarah Scaife Foundation 
at $827 million, Dietrich Foundation at $795 million, and Hillman Family 
Foundation at $791 million.6 
Though we could not possibly address all matters within the 1969 Tax 
Act within the five Articles that are part of this symposium, I think these five 
Articles raise some of the most important, current, and challenging issues 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 Benjamin Soskis, Both More and No More: The Historical Split Between Charity and 
Philanthropy, October 15, 2014, Hudson.org. https://www.hudson.org/research/10723-both-more-and-
no-more-the-historical-split-between-charity-and-philanthropy. 




6 Joyce Gannon, Pittsburgh's Top Foundations by Grant Money: Hillman Rises in the Ranks, PITT. 
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presented by the 1969 Tax Act and what it means for wealth and philanthropy 
today. 
The 1969 Tax Act adopted rules to separate charities for income tax 
purposes into either public charities or private foundations.7 Public charities 
on the one hand are generally made up of institutions like churches, hospitals, 
and schools, and by those institutions that build a broad public base by 
seeking donations from a large percentage of the public.8 Private foundations 
on the other hand are those charities primarily supported through donations 
by one person or one family.9 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Ford Foundation 
are all private foundations started up by one wealthy family without a public 
constituency to exercise power over the decisions of the charity. Congress 
distrusted private foundations because control lay with a creator or family 
and not a broad public. It saw them as undemocratic institutions. 
After a major Treasury study10 and significant hearings discussed in 
Professor James Fishman’s Article, Congress enacted rules to ensure private 
foundations would work to further charitable purposes. Those rules included 
a prohibition on self-dealing between the foundation and its primary 
donors,11 a requirement that the organization annually pay out to charitable 
purposes 5% of assets,12 a prohibition on holding a significant interest in a 
private company,13 a limitation on investments that might jeopardize the 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 I.R.C. § 509. This distinction had existed prior to this time, but not in as stark a way. See Ellen P. 
Aprill, The Private Foundation Excise Tax on Self-Dealing: Contours, Comparisons, and Character, 17 
PITT. TAX  REV. 297, 301 (2020). 
8 I.R.C. §§ 170(b), 509. 
9 Id. § 509. 
10 S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]. 
11 I.R.C. § 4941. 
12 Id. § 4942. 
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endowment of the foundation,14 and taxes applied to noncharitable 
expenditures.15 
Professor Fishman’s Article, The Private Foundation Rules at Fifty: 
How Did We Get Them and Do They Meet Current Needs?, starts this 
symposium by navigating the history leading up to the 1969 Tax Act.16 His 
Article leaves me at once optimistic and depressed. It leaves me optimistic 
because of the substantial research that went into developing the 1969 Tax 
Act suggesting Congress can and has engaged in real deliberative acts that 
might be models for those who advocate for deliberative democracy. It leaves 
me depressed because it demonstrates that congressmen engaged in much 
demagoguery to pass the Act. Fishman, nevertheless, concludes that the 1969 
Tax Act mostly worked, at least with respect to large foundations. By work, 
Professor Fishman means these organizations largely have legitimacy within 
society today because of the rule-based system ensuring that they work 
towards the public interest. Still, he thinks these rules are not working 
properly as to smaller foundations and perchance we need new rules for them 
ensuring that the public interest is furthered. 
Professor Fishman provides a tremendous service here by telescoping 
this historical view further into the past than just the immediate acts that led 
to the 1969 Tax Act. He gives a richness to the development of this 
legislation. In its own way, his Article is a picture of why sometimes law can 
get made and how it ends up being made. It suggests lawmaking is often 
constructed on a mythologized factual foundation, but that mythology is 
critical to the passing of legislation. 
In The Private Foundation Excise Tax on Self-Dealing: Contours, 
Comparisons, and Character, Professor Ellen P. Aprill looks at the 1969 Tax 
Act provision prohibiting self-dealing.17 Though the paper’s focus may seem 
narrow, it is anything but. She uses this fiftieth anniversary to consider the 
excise tax limitation on self-interested transactions in light of U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Id. § 4944. 
15 Id. § 4945. 
16 James Fishman, The Private Foundation Rules at Fifty: How Did We Get Them and Do They 
Meet Current Needs?, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 247 (2020). 
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Court precedent in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. 
Sebelius18 on the nature of a tax versus a penalty within constitutional 
jurisprudence. She also looks at whether the tax is intended to be a Pigouvian 
tax. 
These two lenses lead to some interesting insights. First, there could be 
some constitutional infirmity with this regime if the NFIB precedent were to 
apply to treat this “tax” as a penalty. Professor Aprill cautions though that 
the self-dealing tax passed constitutional muster in the past and the potential 
constitutional infirmity is far from clear under the NFIB precedent. Second, 
Professor Aprill considers whether the excise tax is intended to be a 
Pigouvian tax in order to correct some market failure and if that is the case 
whether the IRS has the capacity to use this Pigouvian tool well. She 
concludes that the design of the tax and the capability of the IRS are unsuited 
to correcting the market failure involved. To Professor Aprill, it may be 
impossible for the IRS to serve as a regulator of the charitable sector. The 
IRS simply does not have the knowledge necessary nor the latitude to set 
these penalties to accord with the harm associated with self-dealing acts. It 
leads her to back a growing position within the charitable world—we should 
consider replacing the IRS with some other agency in its charitable regulatory 
duty.19 
Professor Aprill’s analysis is powerful. If indeed the IRS’s primary tools 
are nothing but Pigouvian taxes to regulate charitable activity, it is likely a 
poor regulator of the sector because of the inability to calculate the harm 
involved. Because I do not think the primary harm of private foundation self-
dealing lies in the use of a nonprofit for selfish reasons, but in the misuse of 
federal tax benefits, I think that the tax code likely still needs these 
protections as long as we are to maintain significant tax benefits for 
charitable contributions. It makes sense to broadly stop self-dealing 
transactions because it makes it possible to use a simple rule rather than a 
complex standard to regulate private foundations.20 Of course, Professor 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
19 Aprill, supra note 7, at 336. 
20 See Philip Hackney, Charitable Organization Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 
83 (2015) (arguing the IRS ought to publish more simple rules for the charitable world to enable the best 
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Aprill raises the fair counter that it is possible this highly strict regime is less 
than optimal in obtaining compliance. 
Professor Ray Madoff in The Five Percent Fig Leaf focuses implicitly 
upon a conundrum of the charitable world and one Congress seems to have 
considered as it contemplated enacting the 1969 Tax Act.21 Can you meet a 
charitable purpose by managing investments and paying out some portion of 
those investments to charity? If you can, what is the amount of money you 
must pay out? Must the entirety be spent over a certain defined period of 
time? One part of this conundrum, that an organization can demonstrate its 
charitable nature by managing investment funds and granting dollars to 
charitable causes, has always given me pause because of the mixed purposes 
involved. Is the primary purpose to manage funds, to hold funds for future 
charitable activity, or to grant funds to actual charitable purposes? The 1969 
Tax Act made clear that such a combined activity indeed met the charitable 
purpose test found in § 501(c)(3). 
While Professor Madoff, like Professor Fishman, believes that the 5% 
payout has been successful in legitimizing private foundations in the larger 
culture of the United States, she argues we have been conned into this belief 
by what she refers to as the “five percent fig-leaf.” The payout is a fig-leaf 
because a significant portion of the 5% payout can so easily be utilized for 
selfish purposes. 
Professor Madoff does not take an explicit stand on whether 5% is the 
right amount to justify the tax exemption of private foundations. However, 
she in effect argues that such an amount is at least a minimum. Though it is 
a minimum, at least three rules undermine the sufficiency of that charitable 
payout. First, administrative expenses count toward the payout. This allows 
a donor’s family to be well compensated. Secondly, program-related 
investments (PRIs) are counted toward the payout. PRIs are investments that 
are considered charitable in nature.22 In a PRI, a private foundation makes a 
“charitable” investment that in theory no investor would make, in order to 
hopefully correct some ill of society. These are thought to further a charitable 
purpose. Professor Madoff argues that while this category of “charitable” 
investment was once narrow, its bounds have expanded to include many 
traditional investments. This expansion erodes the duty to contribute to real 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 See Ray D. Madoff, The Five Percent Fig Leaf, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 341 (2020). 
22 I.R.C. § 4944(c). 
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charitable purposes. Finally, private foundations can meet their payout with 
a payment to a donor-advised fund. A donor-advised fund (DAF) is an 
account maintained at a public charity referred to as a sponsoring 
organization. The sponsoring organization generally invests DAF funds until 
the donor of a particular fund advises the sponsoring organization as to which 
charity it ought to make grants. 
It seems hard to argue with the claim that payouts to DAFs should not 
count. Congress in the 1969 Tax Act directed private foundations to make a 
payout to charity annually, and DAFs are no more than middlemen. If I am 
given pause by the ability of private foundations to invest funds and pay 
grants for charitable purposes, I simply cannot at all accept the legitimacy of 
investing funds to pay “charitable” grants to another fund to pay “charitable” 
grants. Similarly, the allowance of big salaries and cushy trips for donor 
children to count as payout appears problematic on its face. The richest 
discussion at the symposium ensued regarding PRIs. That conversation 
returns us to Carnegie’s urtext encouraging philanthropic investment over 
direct payment to those in charitable need. While we did not solve that 
conundrum, if you read Professor Madoff’s and Professor Brakman’s 
Articles together, I think you will have a much stronger sense of the debate. 
Reading Professor Madoff’s Article suggests to me that we need a better 
dataset of how private foundations are used. Work is being done, such as that 
by Professor Brian Galle.23 Nevertheless, it is odd that we can have so much 
information from reporting to the IRS on Form 990-PF, the tax information 
return of a private foundation, and still feel poor in good data to make 
decisions about the efficacy of the laws and regulations applicable to private 
foundations.24 Perhaps there are two problems: (1) the data collected is not 
all of the right data, and (2) the data is misleading because of a failure to 
require private foundations to report in a uniform manner. We could use more 
scholarship examining how to generate better data in this realm through a 
more thoughtfully designed Form 990-PF. 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 See, e.g. Brian D. Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow the Law? Evidence from Adoption of the 
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 36 J. OF POL ANALYSIS & MGT. (2016) (using 
IRS data on private foundations to determine whether private foundations were complying with 
UPMIFA). 
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In her Article, Foundation Regulation in Our Age of Impact, Professor 
Dana Brakman Reiser inspects the idea that investments by charity today 
must have “impact.”25 By this, people mean that a private foundation 
investment ought to align with its mission. The philanthropic community has 
recently taken great interest in searching for such investments of impact.26 
While philanthropic institutions might seem to be a natural place to pursue 
such a portfolio, Professor Brakman Reiser notes private foundations have 
been hesitant to pursue these strategies. They apparently fear violating the 
rule prohibiting private foundations from making jeopardizing investments. 
Professor Brakman Reiser provides helpful pragmatic suggestions on how 
we might modify the rules to make such activity possible. 
Professor Brakman Reiser’s Article highlights that the 1969 Tax Act 
was enacted at a certain place in time with a very particular understanding of 
investment and charitable acts. Those notions look dated now. That lack of 
connection to today’s circumstances augurs for a remodel of our legal 
structure regulating the space of philanthropy. Maybe it even needs a 
complete restructuring. Professor Brakman Reiser focuses first on impact 
through what are known as mission-related investments (MRIs). In MRIs, 
foundations invest with goals other than total return in mind, such as 
environmental, social, and governance factors, but the investment is not 
considered charitable for tax purposes. 
If this current of mistrust regarding investing to further a charitable 
purpose is latent in MRIs, it is at the forefront of discussions regarding PRIs. 
However, Professor Brakman Reiser advances this discussion by proposing 
some potential solutions to this impasse. Her Article, and her work generally, 
highlights the way the world may simply move past the charitable regulatory 
architecture created in the 1969 Tax Act if it is not modified to conform to 
the demands of today’s social justice-minded donor. If we want that 
architecture to have continuing importance, some changes are almost surely 
needed to permit greater flexibility to foundation boards. 
Professor Brakman Reiser’s Article operates as a counterpoint to 
Professor Madoff’s Article. Professor Brakman Reiser sees investing dollars 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Regulation in Our Age of Impact, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 357 (2020). 
26 In 2017, the Ford Foundation announced that it would invest a large portion of its endowment to 
“earn not only attractive financial returns but concrete social returns as well.” James B. Stewart, Ford 
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with charity in mind to be an important part of a charitable institution. While 
it is not fair to say Professor Madoff is against thoughtful foundation 
investment, I think it fair to say that Professor Madoff is skeptical about the 
idea that the expanded world of private foundation PRI charitable 
investments are all genuinely charitable. Charities show their charitability 
primarily by their acts through grants, not through investments. The 
“charitable investing” idea is seen in the Carnegie urtext and imbued by the 
old adage “give a man a fish, and he will eat for a day; teach the man to fish, 
and he will eat for a lifetime.” The skepticism to this investing approach 
perhaps grows with experience over years watching U.S. inequality increase 
year after year, all while we are told that the investors will be the solution to 
social problems spurred on by that same inequality. 
Professor Khrista McCarden writes on private operating foundations 
that establish and maintain art museums, such as the J. Paul Getty 
Foundation.27 She is concerned that these foundations are highly private in 
nature. Written before the start of the racial justice revolution spurred on by 
the killing of Mr. George Floyd, her Article presciently investigates whether 
a charitable purpose can be furthered in a private way, and whether charitable 
organizations should be regulated to provide more to systematically 
disempowered communities. This is an interesting area to review and it 
highlights some of the challenges of dealing with defining a charitable 
purpose in the first place. 
As Professor Fishman demonstrated, many of the senators considering 
the 1969 Tax Act highlighted to good political effect how wealthy individuals 
like the Mellons utilized charitable dollars to further abstruse interests like 
art and scholarly endeavors.28 As someone who is deeply engaged and 
invested in the art world, I particularly appreciate the importance of the 
preservation of art. I believe the preservation of art and antiquities is 
important to our humanity in and of itself and is worth doing. However, I 
believe it critical that that preservation come with broad public access, and 
Professor McCarden’s Article speaks very clearly to this point. Crucially, her 
position is that art museums must not just be open to the public but should 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Khrista McCarden, Private Operating Foundation Reform and J. Paul Getty, 17 PITT. TAX REV. 
387 (2020). 
28 Fishman, supra note 16, at 262. 
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demonstrate the ways in which their reach extends to disempowered 
communities. 
One technical challenge to Professor McCarden’s Article is the very 
nature of the 1969 Tax Act. It legitimized “private” foundations. In that vein, 
I think the presumption that private art museums fail as a tax exemption 
matter because they are private and not public misses a part of the 1969 Tax 
Act. A “private” foundation is very much the opposite within charity of a 
public charity. While I agree that private nature is deeply problematic from a 
normative standpoint, Congress sanctioned private charity, private control, 
and private investment. To be fair, private foundations are by law required to 
meet the requirements of § 501(c)(3) by primarily furthering charitable 
purposes that must be public in nature.29 The problem is that the wealthy 
contributor is the primary arbiter of that purpose and there is little chance the 
IRS will challenge that purpose privately determined. Still, this criticism does 
not take any power away from Professor McCarden’s Article as it 
interrogates that private nature of this type of philanthropy. 
Professor McCarden also suggests that these private operating 
foundations might be uniquely likely to be infected with bad acts (actors). 
My guess is that these concerns run across private foundations, but perhaps 
there is greater potential for operating foundations like the Getty Trust 
discussed in her Article that focus on collecting expensive art to engage in 
more private acts benefitting their founders. I laud her call to open access to 
these institutions to not just the “public” but to systemically disempowered 
populations. 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
I am excited to share this set of Articles with you. They confirm that the 
1969 Tax Act responded to real concern and real need, but that the 
architecture needs some reconsideration today, fifty years later. These 
Articles help move that conversation forward about what a new private 
foundation architecture might look like, or if perhaps that architecture simply 
cannot do the task that it has been asked to accomplish. 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Rev. Rul. 74-600, 1974-2 C.B. 385 (the placing of three paintings on the premises of the founder 
of the private foundation considered an act of self-dealing taxable under § 4941 of the Code); IRS Tech. 
Adv. Mem. 88-24-001 (June 17, 1988) (finding displays of artwork in the founder’s home with little 
access to the public both an act of self-dealing and a substantial nonexempt purpose). 
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As I reflect on this symposium that took place in 2019 before the 
origination of COVID-19 and the racial justice revolution ignited by the 
killing of Mr. George Floyd in Minneapolis, I think about the great potential 
of well-democratically-harnessed philanthropy and seriously doubt that can 
be accomplished within the space of “private” philanthropy. I lean strongly 
towards eliminating tax benefits for this private “philanthropy” by denying 
tax exempt status to those organizations that are not public charities. 
Why do I say this? Fundamentally, I believe the effort of philanthropy 
should not be publicly supported if it is not collectively determined.30 To me, 
Professor McCarden makes the beginnings of a persuasive case that the 
values inculcated and supported through the private foundation system are 
likely predominately exclusive ones rather than public ones. I think that lack 
of a public nature should matter. Oddly, the private foundation tax 
architecture not only supports these wealthy exclusive preferences, but as 
Professor McCarden points out, it forces the private foundation to spend a lot 
of money every year into the future furthering those preferences of the 
wealthy. To be clear, the problem with this form of philanthropy is not that 
it might support abstruse interests such as senators complained about with 
respect to the Mellons, but that it works to provide significant and lasting 
governmental benefits to the private, perhaps well meaning interests, of 
people simply because they happen to be wealthy. The private foundation tax 
architecture provides this support, lifts these efforts up, in the name of 
supporting collective efforts, but they are far from collectively led. 
I believe deeply in the power of a fiercely independent and courageous 
civil society that empowers the voices of all in our communities, particularly 
those voices that have been and continue to be disempowered. But, the 
private foundation tax architecture even at its best likely can never really 
support such a vision because it is defined privately. And, as Professor Aprill 
shows, the lack of IRS enforcement capability likely makes this architecture 
weak anyway and unlikely to be able to ever ensure such a democratically 
based vision. The private foundation community is imbued with some 
important social justice voices such as Darren Walker of the Ford 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 See Philip Hackney, Political Justice and Tax Policy: The Social Welfare Organization Case, 8 
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (arguing that tax policy should prioritize political justice defined 
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Foundation31 and Elizabeth Alexander of the Mellon Foundation.32 Still, I 
believe its predominate ethic is that of Carnegie from The Gospel of Wealth: 
that the wealthy man is the savior of the rest of us, both in terms of their 
ability to invest their dollars and to spend them in ways that improve all lives. 
I think that wrong and harmful. That vision is not just antithetical to 
democracy, but it is antithetical to racial, gender, sexual orientation, and 
social justice. Given this, I think we ought to eliminate tax benefits for the 
private foundation form. 
But this is only one view. I have enormous admiration for the work 
carried out by our philanthropic community. The voices included here do too 
and each presents a different approach to the challenge taken on by Congress 
fifty years ago. I expect we will still be struggling with this same challenge 
fifty years from now. Please read on and consider the voices that follow. 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 Laura Hambleton, Catalyst Darren Walker, A Leader for Social Justice, SMITHSONIAN MAG. 
(Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/blogs/impact/2019/11/13/catalyst-darren-walker-
leader-social-justice/. 
32 Len Gutkin, Elizabeth Alexander on the Mellon Foundation’s New Direction, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (July 6, 2020), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Elizabeth-Alexander-on-the/249120. 
